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ABSTRACT
While standard political economy theories suggest a moderating effect of democratization
on income inequality, empirical literature has failed to uncover any such robust
relationship.  Here we take yet another look at this issue arguing first, that prevailing
ideology may be an important determinant of inequality and, second, that the
democratization effect “works through”  ideology. In societies where equality is highly
valued there is less of a distributional conflict across income groups, hence
democratization may have only a negligible effect on inequality. On the other hand, in
societies where equality is not valued as much, democratization reduces inequality
through redistribution as the poor outvote the rich. Our cross-country empirical analysis,
covering the period 1960-98 and 126 countries, confirms the hypothesis: ideology – as
proxied by a country’s dominant religion – seems to be related to inequality. But, in
addition, in  Judeo-Christian societies increased democratization appears to lead to lower
inequality, while in Muslim and Confucian societies democratization has only an
insignificant effect on inequality. We hypothesize that in the latter group of countries,
desired level of inequality is reached through informal transfers, while in Judeo-Christian
societies where family ties are weaker, desired outcome is achieved by political action.
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1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that the distribution of income in an economy may, to a large
extent, depend on political factors.  More specifically, a natural hypothesis is that a more
egalitarian distribution of political rights in the form of a political democracy should be
accompanied by a more equal income distribution.  Indeed, this hypothesis has a
celebrated tradition in social sciences (Lipset,1959, Lenski, 1966, Meltzer and Richard,
1981).  Empirical research testing this hypothesis has also loomed large.  Political
scientists, economists, and sociologists alike have devoted a great deal of energies
arguing whether or not the hypothesis holds.  The existing evidence, however, does not
find any robust relationship between democracy and inequality in a cross-country
regression analysis. Thus, Bollen and Jackman, 1985, fail to detect such a relationship; Li
et al., 1998, find some limited support for a negative relationship between democracy and
inequality;  Rodrik, 1999, presents evidence that democracy is associated with a higher
share of wages in GDP and thus lower inequality.
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Indeed, a casual inspection of recent events in East Europe as well as in East Asia
casts doubts that any such simple relationship may exist.  It has been argued that, in the
East European countries, democratization of the 90’s actually resulted in an increase in
income inequality – for the review of findings supporting this claim see Fleming and
Micklewright, 2000.  Similarly, some of the East Asian countries such as South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore have had among the most egalitarian income distributions in the
world, yet their political record is far from democratic.
These observations lead us to consider additional factors, which may affect
income inequality alongside democracy.  A clue in the search for such factors is provided3
by the experience of the East European countries under the communist regime.  There is
little doubt that in this era, the political rights’ record in these countries was especially
miserable.  Yet, the distribution of income was quite egalitarian, especially when
compared with other countries with similar per capita income levels.  This is most likely
true even when one takes into account the fact that income was derived from non-market
transactions, that some of it was given in kind, and a substantial portion of income was in
fact determined by a person’s status (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, Milanovic,
1998, 1999, and the review of Fleming and Micklewright, 2000).
One reason for this could be that the prevailing political ideology of these
countries was deeply rooted in the egalitarian tradition.  To be sure, differences in
political power as well as in social status existed and were at least as powerful as
everywhere else, but income differences were not much approved by the populace.
Ostentatious display of the rich was frowned upon and very uncommon; modest material
life and the ability to make ends meet with little means were praised. This may imply that
in a cross-country comparison, ideology needs to be taken into consideration when
examining income distribution and its relationship to democracy.
While the concepts of political culture and ideology have been controversial and
elusive in the social sciences, they seem too important to be neglected altogether.
Cultural values may play an important role in shaping policies and the resulting cross-
country differences in economic outcomes may to a large extent hinge on different
ideologies.  Indeed, a substantial body of political literature exists (e.g., Almond and
Verba, 1963, and Abramson and Inglehart, 1996) which emphasizes the relationship
between culture and ideology on the one hand and political economic institutions on the4
other hand.  More specifically, Granato et al., 1996, studies how the former may affect
economic development;
2 Gradstein and Justman, 2000, investigate the socializing role of
education and its effect on the efficiency of resource allocation; Bisin and Verdier, 2000,
offer a dynamic evolutionary model of cultural transmission.
This paper is an attempt to employ the insights derived from that literature to
study the effect of democracy on income inequality.  We stipulate that the outcome of
redistribution, and hence inequality, hinges on the details of the political process: when it
is democratized, the resulting level of income inequality is expected to be lower than
when it is controlled by a rich oligarchy.  But it also depends on the society’s
predisposition towards equity: if equity is valuable in itself, then even the rich oligarchy
will avoid extreme inequality.  This implies that democratization process in societies
which value equity will result in only marginal further reduction in inequality. This is in
contrast to societies for which equity in itself is immaterial, and where transition of
political power to the majority results in much more aggressive redistribution and
inequality reduction.
This view of the effect of democracy on inequality through the prism of ideology
is tested in the empirical part of the paper.  Over the last decades, several reasonable
measures of the degree to which countries are democratic have been generated.  A subset
of these measures is used in this paper.  For inequality we use the high quality Gini data
set compiled by World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER, 1999).
While a proxy for ideology may be difficult to construe, as a first approximation we use
the dominant religion in a country, whereas the predominantly atheist post communist
countries form a separate category.
3 Our analysis of unbalanced panel data for the period5
1960-98 and 126 countries provides support for the hypothesis that ideological factors are
important determinants of income inequality.  While in certain countries, mostly in the
Judeo-Christian tradition, the expansion of democracy is likely to result in substantial
inequality reduction, in other countries (Buddhist/Hindu, Confucian, Communist) such
effect is negligible or absent altogether.  These findings are obtained even when
controlling for other variables, which traditionally have been thought as affecting
inequality.   Another, surprising, finding of this paper is the different impact of political
institutions on the relationship between democracy and inequality.  Specifically, we
present evidence that the negative relationship between democracy and inequality is more
likely to hold—for a given level of democracy—in countries with parliamentary rather
than presidential system.  Although this finding was not anticipated by the empirical
design, we consider it to be interesting enough to be reported here.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes a very simple theoretical
framework and its analysis; section 3 presents the data to be used for the empirical part,
the analysis of which is undertaken in section 4; finally, section 5 closes with brief
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1.  Description of the economy
The model economy consists of a finite but large number of agents indexed by i =1,..,N.
The agents are initially endowed with an exogenously given income yi0.  The distribution
of initial income in the population is assumed to be skewed, so that the median income
ym0 lies below its mean Y0, and we let F denote the cdf of income.   All individuals share6
identical preferences.  These are derived over an individual’s income ex post taxes and
transfers, as well as over the distribution of this income across the individuals in the
economy.  Letting yi1 denote individual i’s ex post income, we write his overall utility as:
U(yi1) + W(y11,…, yN1)( 1 )
where both U and W are continuous, U is monotonic and concave and W is symmetric and
quasiconcave.
Note that the first term in the above expression is the utility from own income,
whereas the second term represents the utility an individual derives from income
distribution in the population. The assumptions on W guarantee that it captures preference
for equality in the sense that its value increases as a result of an equalizing transfer from a
richer to a poorer individual – see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1973.  It will be convenient to
relate W to a standard inequality measure, such as the Gini coefficient, or a coefficient of
variation and to think of utility as a linear combination between own income and such
inequality measure; this then would allow us to write individual utility as:
yi1 - α I(y11,…, yN1) (1’)
where α > 0 is interpreted as the parameter related to disutility from income inequality,
called equality preference, and I is the inequality measure.
The above depicted economy is a special case of the one considered in, for
example, Arrow, 1983, Becker, 1974, and Hochman and Rodgers, 1969. Existence of the
second term in the utility specification implies that the individuals may want to voluntary
transfer part of their initial endowment in order to decrease income inequality. As is
shown in Arrow, 1983, however, the amount of voluntary transfers is typically inefficient
because of the free riding effect: every giver hopes that the additional transfers will be7
made by the other potential givers, hence not enough income will be transferred.
4  The
implication of this argument in the present context is that, typically, the equilibrium
income inequality is excessively high.
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Alternatively, income redistribution could also be implemented through a formal
redistribution mechanism.  Following the long-standing tradition in the literature (see e.g.
Meltzer and Richard, 1981, and the survey in Persson and Tabellini, 1999, part I), we
assume that this is given by a combination of a proportional income tax and a lump-sum
transfer.  In addition, we assume that such redistribution is associated with a deadweight
loss. The deadweight loss may stem from adverse labor supply effects, or from the
hindering of innovative activity.  Specifically, let t denote the income tax rate.  The
amount of the deadweight loss then is B(t)Y0, where B’, B”>0, B(0) = 0, B(1) = 1. Taking
the deadweight loss into consideration, the relationship between the ex ante and ex post
income of individual i is as follows:
yi1 = (1-t) yi0 + ( t – B(t)) Y0 (2)
Note that Y 1 = (1 – B(t))Y0, so that implementation of this redistribution mechanism
results in average income loss, whose magnitude is positively related to the tax rate.
  The tax rate is chosen by a majority of votes.  We assume that the population of
voters consists of all individuals whose income exceeds a minimal threshold 
−
y : the lower
is the threshold the more democratic the society is, as it allows a larger fraction of the
population to be enfranchised.
Finally, we denote I(t) = I((1-t) y10  + (t-B(t))Y0,…,(1-t) yN0  + (t-B(t))Y0) the
indirect utility from a more equal income distribution as a function of the tax rate.8
2.2 Analysis
In order to characterize the voting equilibrium of this mechanism, we first turn to the
optimal tax rate from the viewpoint of voter i.  The interior optimal tax rate is determined
from the following FOC:
- yi0 + (1-B’(t))Y0 - α dI/dt = 0( 3 )
Differentiation reveals that the second order conditions are satisfied provided that d
2I/dt
2
≥  0 , which holds true for such inequality measures as the Gini coefficient and the
coefficient of variation.
6  Thus, individual preferences are single peaked, and a majority
voting equilibrium exists.
Differentiating (3) with respect to initial income yi0, we obtain, given the
assumptions,
dt/dyi0 = -1/[B”(t) Y0 + α d
2I/dt
2] < 0 (4)
Thus, the preferred tax rate is a decreasing function of income implying that the
politically decisive voter is the one with the median income among the voters.
Differentiation of (3) with respect to α reveals that the higher the equality preference the
higher is the chosen tax rate.  Moreover, differentiating (4) with respect to α we obtain
that d
2t/dyi0dα > 0, implying that the greater is the equality preference, the less steep is
the negative relationship between income and the preferred tax rate, i.e., the more willing
are the rich to bear high taxes.
The implicit characterization of the interior equilibrium tax rate is as follows:
- yd0 + (1-B’(t))Y0 - α dI/dt = 0( 5 )
where yd0 denotes the income level of the decisive voter, which has  the median income in
the voters’ population. The tax rate chosen by the median voter is the one that optimally9
balances reduction in inequality and the deadweight loss of taxation; clearly, the
equilibrium tax rate is an increasing function of the median voter’s income.  Now,
democratization enfranchises some of the poor, lowering the minimal franchise
requirement, 
−
y .  As a result, political power is shifted to a poorer coalition of voters, so
that a poorer voter becomes decisive (yd0 in (5) is decreased), which in turn results in a
higher tax rate and a lower level of inequality (this is why the slope of the line in Figure 1
must be negative).  As we have seen, this effect is weaker when there is concern for
equality, so that α is large (which means that  line BB in  Figure 1 must throughout the
whole range lie above the line AA and be flatter).  The implication is that, when
democratization is enhanced, its inequality reducing effect may be difficult to detect
because of the intervening factor of the social norm of inequality intolerance. The
implication is that, when democratization is enhanced, its inequality reducing effect may
be difficult to detect because of the intervening factor of the social norm of inequality
intolerance.
Summing up,
Proposition 1.  Under formal redistribution, democratization results in higher taxes and
transfers, hence in lower inequality.  This effect is stronger when under the prevailing
ideology concern for equality is small and is weaker when such concern is substantial.
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Figure 1.  Optimal  tax rate and income of the decisive voter in two societies
We now turn to the empirical test of the hypothesis summarized in the above Proposition,
beginning with the description of the data – the variables and the sample – and then
proceeding with the estimation.
Income of the decisive
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Optimal tax rate
Society with a high α







As argued in the previous part, the effect of democracy on inequality is mediated through
prevailing ideology. We approximate ideology by dominant religion except in the case of
Communist countries where the dominant ideology is, of course, Communism. Appendix
1 shows the ideology data for all the countries in the sample.
8 Our rule in deciding what is
a dominant religion in a given country was that at least 40 percent of the population had
to have the same religion, with the second most numerous religion not exceeding 25
percent of the population.
In a number of cases, however, two or even three religions have similar number of
adherents, and a single dominant ideology could not be defined. In these cases, we have
created hyphenated groups. They are African traditional/Christian which includes
countries where African traditional religion and Christianity claim about the same share
of the population (Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Madagascar,
and Zimbabwe). In these countries, between 33 and 55 percent of the population profess
Christianity (of all denominations), and between 25 and 50 percent of the population
follow the traditional African religions. Another hyphenated category is Buddhist/Hindu.
It includes India, Mauritius, Mongolia (after the end of Communism), Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and Thailand. It was based on the assumption that cultural similarities between Buddhism
and Hinduism are sufficiently great to treat them as one group. Arguing that Christian
practices differ significantly between the countries that were converted to Christianity
relatively recently, that is over the last two centuries as the result of European expansion,12
we have created a category of “New Christian” countries that includes African (e.g.
Gabon, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia), Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago), and Oceanic
(Papua New Guinea) countries. In these countries, the dominant religion is Christian but
the population has been relatively recently converted (as opposed to, say, Australia or
Canada which are what Maddison called “European off-shoots”). Finally, in some
countries, more than two  religious groups claim sizeable percentage of the population
(e.g. Nigeria with more than 40 percent of the population following Islam, about a third
Christian, and about a fifth professing traditional African beliefs). These countries where
there is no single dominant religion (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago) were  classified as
“mixed religion.”
  For democracy, we use five variables. Two variables come from the Polity98D data
source (version June 2000). 
9 The two variables we use are the extent of democracy
(Dem) and openness of the political system or party competitiveness (Parcomp). Dem
defined as “general openness of political institutions” ranges from 0 to 10; parcomp,
defined as “extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for
political expression” ranges from 0 to 5 (definitions taken from the codebook of Polity
database by Jaggers [1996]
10). Values of both variables increase as level of democracy
and political openness increase. The advantage of the Polity98D is that it provides a long
series of data stretching in some cases back to the 19
th century. The disadvantage, a
serious one, is lack of transparency in how the scores are calculated. While the authors
mention a number of checkpoints which they follow, they are very broad so that it very
unclear how, in practice, they are instrumentalized, and the judgments are, of course,13
subjective.
11 The problem with Polity database is that there are neither objective criteria
used for measuring democracy, nor can a user see and check for himself how the authors
have arrived to their judgments. Basically, one needs to accept the authors’ judgments on
faith.
These drawbacks are remedied by the newly created Database of Political
Institutions (DPI), which is explained and discussed in Beck et al. (2000). We use three
variables from DPI. They are type of political system (System) which ranges from 0 to 2,
with 0 indicating a presidential system, 1 assembly-elected president, and 2 a
parliamentary system. Two points are important to underscore with respect to this
variable. First, regimes with a low level of Executive Political Competitiveness (in other
words, authoritarian or dictatorial regimes) score 0 on the System index; and the same
holds for regimes where presidents are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose
only function is to elect the president), and where there is no prime minister. Second, DPI
uses a set of clear rules to distinguish between the parliamentary and presidential systems,
such as presidential veto power, presidential appointment of ministers and dissolution of
the parliamet.  Thus, the French system is classified as parliamentary, because the Prime
Minister depends only on parliamentary majority and not on president’s will, and the
Russian system as presidential since the Prime Minister is both proposed by the President
and needs to be rejected by the Duma, which obviously requires a lower level of
parliamentary support than the need to muster parliamentary majority. As can be seen
from this example, the DPI database’s main advantage over other measures of democracy
is its transparency: the rules in classifying the regimes are very clear and are based on
“objective” indicators.14
The second DPI variable we use is Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness
(EIEC) index. The index ranges from 1 to 7, with competitively elected presidents or
prime ministers depending on who is assigned the Chief Executive title (e.g., in the US, it
would be president, in the UK, it would be prime minister) getting 6 or 7.  For example,
thr chief executives of Communist nations (the chairman of the Communist Party) are
given a 3, because they are elected by the Party Congress, electing bodies which they do
not appoint.  Executives elected by small, appointed juntas or by appointed electoral
colleges get a 2.  Rival chief executives in one country, particularly in the setting of
armed conflicts, are counted as No executives, and thus score a 1; see Beck et al., 2000,
for a more complete elaboration.
Very similar rules and ranking are used for Legislative Index of Political
Competitiveness (LIEC). The scale also ranges from 1 to 7. The rules are: if there is no
legislature LIEC scores 1, if there is an unelected legislature 2; elected legislature with
single candidates (like in many Communist countries) scores 3; single party with multiple
candidates scores 4; if multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats (like in
many Arab countries), the score is 5; if some parties had won seats but the largest party
received more than 75 percent of all seats, the score is 6; and finally, if there are multiple
parties and none holds more than 75 percent of all seats, the score is 7.
Table 1 shows simple correlations between the five measures of democracy. It can
be easily noticed that the two measures from Polity98D (Democracy and Party
Competitiveness) are very strongly correlated (0.93). One of the DPI measures (EIEC)
also seems to measure similar aspects of democracy as Polity98D variables. The
correlation between EIEC and the Polity measures is about 0.80. The correlation is15
weaker (a little over 0.70) between the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness
and the two Polity98D measures. Finally, the correlation between System and all other
measures of democracy is relatively weak. Basically, we can conclude that Democracy
and Party Competitiveness seem to measure the same thing (which is not surprising in
light of lack of transparent and objective criteria used in the derivation of the Polity98D
data), and what they measure seems to be similar (close to) competitiveness in elections
for the executive office. The variables LIEC and System do measure, as explained in the
DPI manual, competitiveness in legislative elections, and the type of political system
(presidential vs. parliamentary).
Table 1. Simple correlations between the various democracy measures
System EIEC LIEC Dem
EIEC 0.44
LIEC 0.39 0.86
Dem 0.53 0.80 0.73
Parcomp 0.48 0.79 0.75 0.93
In addition to these five measures of democracy, we also create two interacted
variables, by interacting respectively EIEC and LIEC with the political system.
The last control variable we use is the level of economic development which we
approximate by GDP per capita expressed in international dollars of equal purchasing
power parity (PPP). The benchmark year is 1995 for which we have the actual $PPP
levels for more than 100 countries. 
12 We then use real GDP changes to derive the
GDPPPP  levels in the previous years going all the way to 1960. Thus all the GDP per
capita data are expressed in PPP levels using the international prices of the year 1995.
Most of the data are obtained from the on-line World Bank data base (called SIMA),16
while for some countries—mostly transition economies, and in particular the former
republics of the USSR—we had to calculate their real per capita growth rate using the
countries’ statistical yearbooks. 
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Finally, for the dependent variable, we use Gini coefficients as reported in the most
recent (June 2000) WIDER database.
14 It contains 909 high-quality Gini observations
from 126 countries. The data are described in detail in WIDER (1999). The Gini
coefficients reported vary as to the recipient (household or individual),  welfare indicator
(income or expenditures), and net or gross measurement (net is after deduction of
personal taxes). Following the approach taken Li, Squire and Zou (1998), we use dummy
variables to adjust for each of these characteristics. 
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3.2.  Sample
Our data are longitudinal. We have a total of 126 countries in the sample.
16 For most of
these countries GDPPPP per capita data go back to the early 1960’s. For example, from
1965 forward, in no year are there GDPPPP per capita data for fewer than 105
countries.
17 Note, however, that to conduct a panel analysis for all years since 1960, the
limiting factor is the availability of the Gini data. In only a few exceptional cases (United
States, UK, Taiwan, Bulgaria, India), inequality data are available for most years. For the
vast majority of countries, such data are available in time intervals of several years, and
for many countries, the WIDER data base gives only a few observations.
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 All currently existing countries (year 2000) are “projected back” into the past. We
mean by that that individual data are collected for all former USSR republics, for the
Czech republic and Slovakia separately, for all five successor states of the former17
Yugoslavia, and for Pakistan and Bangladesh (until 1972, East Pakistan).
19 For all the
“current” countries (formerly republics/parts of larger entities), we use the republican
GDP’s, population, or Gini coefficients. The political variables for each of the republics
are often, but not always, the same as for the entire country where they belonged.
While the GDPPPP data vary a lot in time, the variability is less for the political
variables, either in Polity98D or DPI database. However, they too are time-variant as
shown in Tables 2 and 3 on the example of Dem variable from Polity98D, and EIEC from
the DPI database. We see from the last columns in Table 2 that only the least democratic
(value 0) and the most democratic (value 10) observations tend to stay in the same group:
conditional on having democracy level 0 or 10, respectively 66 and almost 70 percent of
cases (or time) such countries remain in the same group. The constancy of the other levels
of democracy is much less (between 11 and 23 percent). The same regularity is observed
for EIEC: the stability of political arrangements is the greatest at the extremes. 64 percent
of the time, countries where the chief executive is elected by a party congress or by
referendum or “popular acclamation” stay in the same category; 52 percent of time,
countries whose chief executive is competitively elected and gets less than 75 percent of
the vote, remain in the same group.18
















0 2417 46.2 86 71.1 66.1
1 260 5.0 32 26.5 18.4
2 109 2.1 18 14.9 14.1
3 142 2.7 29 24.0 11.4
4 86 1.6 17 14.1 11.4
5 86 1.6 19 15.7 10.2
6 170 3.3 26 21.5 15.0
7 220 4.2 21 17.4 22.6
8 379 7.2 48 39.7 18.0
9 256 4.9 25 20.7 22.9
10 1108 21.2 34 28.1 69.7
Total 5233 100 355 293.4 33.6
Table 3. Variable Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness from DPI













Elected  by a junta, or by an
appointed electoral college; or
unilateral extension of the term of
office; or elected for life  (2)
485 17.5 51 41.5 42.0
Elected by a party congress,
referendum or acclamation  (3)
669 24.1 46 37.4 64.1
3.5 15 0.5 2 1.6 32.6
Several candidates from one party
(4)
54 1.9 7 5.7 36.7
Several parties field candidates,
only one gets all votes (5)
8 0.3 3 2.4 11.6
5.5 5 0.2 1 0.8 21.7
Competitively elected with more
than 75% of vote (6)
254 9.1 31 25.2 35.7
6.5 94 3.4 20 16.3 20.5
Competitively elected with less
than 75% of vote (6)
1196 43.0 101 82.1 52.3
Total 2780 100 262 213.0 46.8
The situation, however, is very different as far as religious variables are concerned.
That variable itself is much more sluggish since religious composition of  population does
not change fast. Practically, the only source of variability is the change from Communist19
to whatever the dominant religious affiliation may be in the case of countries that have
abandoned Communism. Table 4 shows that out of 4861 observations (of countries in
different points in time) some 22.7 percent are Catholic, followed by 17.1 percent
Communist, 16.7  percent Muslim etc. The last column show the extent of variability in
the ideology variable. We see that in 5 out of 11 religious affiliations, the variable is time-
invariant. For example, the Christian mixed, New Christian, Confucian, or Buddhist
observations are in 100 percent of cases constant;  countries that are once classified as
Catholic, remain so in 85.6 percent of cases,  Protestant/ Evangelical Protestant remain so
in 86.8 percent etc. On average, once a country is given a certain affiliation, in 85.6
percent of the cases it remains within that affiliation. The only reason why the variable is
not entirely time-invariant is that Communist countries have, after the end of the Cold
War, changed their dominant ideology.








Catholic 1101 22.2 33 26.2 85.6
Protestant/Evangelical 406 8.2 12 9.5 86.8
Orthodox 142 2.9 10 7.9 36.4
Christian mixed/Judaism 195 3.9 5 4.0 100.0
New Christian 351 7.1 9 7.1 100.0
Muslim 812 16.4 24 19.1 86.8
Buddhism 203 4.1 6 4.8 86.8
African Christ/traditional 234 4.7 6 4.8 100.0
Confucian 205 4.1 5 4.0 100.0
Communist 861 17.4 27 21.4 83.7
Mixed 440 8.9 10 7.9 100.0
Total 4950 100 147 116.7 85.65
Note: Number of countries shows all countries that have, at least once, had a given religion. Thus,
for example, if a country changes from Communism to Orthodoxy, the country would be included in both
groups (Communism and Orthodoxy). This explains why there are 147 countries in the sample, and why the
percentage column gives 116.7 percent.20
4. Empirical estimation
4.1. Methodology
We use the following specification:
) * ; ; ; ( iti i i it it it DEM IDEOLOGY IDEOLOGY DEM GDP fct GINI = (6)
where subscript i refers to country and t to year (from 1960 to 1998). In the empirical
estimation, GDP per capita expressed in the 1995 dollars of equal purchasing parity (PPP)
enters both linearly and squared, as is conventionally done to reflect some Kuznets-type
movement of inequality. Democracy (DEM) is approximated by the five  variables
described above. The IDEOLOGY dummies test for the possibility, explained earlier, that
some ideologies may be more sensitive to equality than others. Finally, the interaction
between ideology and democracy tests for our hypothesis (Proposition 1) that democracy
may exert a differential impact on inequality depending on the prevailing
religious/political affiliation of the country. In other words we posit that the effect of
religion or ideology on inequality is exerted through two channels: directly (as reflected
in the ideology dummies) and through differential effect of democracy on inequality
depending on the religious-ideological context within which democratization occurs.
We expect the effect of GDP per capita to be of the usual inverted-U shape, the
impact of democracy to be negative, while the coefficients on the IDEOLOGY dummies
and the interaction term between ideology and democracy are not determined on an a
priori basis.
The data are an unbalanced panel covering 38 years and 126 countries, primarily
because of unevenly spaced observations on the Gini coefficient. IDEOLOGY (religion)21
is clearly exogeneous. While the effect of inequality on growth has recently been hotly
debated, with arguments put forward that the effect is both positive and negative (for an
excellent review of the literature and testing of the hypotheses, see Perotti, 1996), the
influence of inequality on GDP levels is unlikely, so that reverse causality is not a
problem. Reverse causation can, however, be a problem with the DEMOCRACY
variable. Inequality can influence the level of democracy, and we address this problem by
lagging DEMOCRACY. The use of lagged DEMOCRACY, however, is not only an
econometric expedient. It has a substantive role too. It is reasonable to assume that the
effect of democracy on inequality, if any, is unlikely to be instantaneous. While political
changes can be fast (a country can move swiftly from a dictatorship to a democracy, and
perhaps within a relatively short time span from democracy to dictatorship), they are
unlikely to immediately affect the relatively stable economic forces which underlie
inequality. This is why in addition to one-period (one-year) lagged democracy, we also
use the average of the DEMOCRACY values for years t-1 to t-3.
20
 We also need to control for country effects. Without this adjustment it is quite
conceivable, for example, that what is retrieved as a religious effect is in reality a country
effect. This may be particularly a problem for religious practices that exist in only a few
countries. For example, is relatively low inequality in Taiwan due to ideological
preferences for equality, or to the fact that a successful agrarian reform and privatization
were conducted in the 1950’s which in turn, derive from the past of Japanese occupation
and the Communist threat from the Mainland? All regressions therefore include country
dummies.22
4.2. Effect of democracy
The first four columns in Tables 5 and 6 show the results of estimating equation 1 with
four formulations of the DEMOCRACY variables; the next two columns include
interaction of DEMOCRACY with the system variable. 
21 Table 5 presents the results
using a one-year lag formulation for DEMOCRACY, while in Table 6 we use the average
value of DEMOCRACY during the three previous years. As expected, the effect of
democracy is negative in all formulations but is not statistically significant (at 5 percent
level) anywhere. However, the significance is almost always stronger when we use the
three-year lagged formulation.  This conforms with Muller, 1988, who similarly finds that
the stability of democracy is a better predictor of inequality that the one time level of
democracy.
However, democracy may affect inequality not only directly but through the type of
political system. In other words, democracy in a parliamentary system may have a
different impact on inequality than democracy in a presidential system. The former is
closer to a direct democracy and, by giving a greater role to the political parties and
formation of coalition governments, may stimulate redistributionist policies of the type
that we generally associate with the median voter behavior. The effect of a democratic
presidential system on inequality is more difficult to gauge on an a priori ground.  A
strong president, once elected, is not subject to the day-to-day “control” of the political
parties, and ultimately, voters which is a key characteristic of parliamentary regimes.
President can thus pursue a wider range of distributional policies; in some cases, he/she
may opt for policies that increase (e.g. Salinas in Mexico), and in other cases, for policies
that reduce (e.g. Chavez in Venezuela) inequality. To account for the political system, we23
interact political system (system variable from DPI) with competitiveness in election for
the executive office and legislature (respectively EIEC and LIEC). The results are shown
in columns 5 and 6 (Tables 5 and 6). We see that the parliamentary and the mixed system
(strong president elected by parliament) are associated with reduced inequality compared
to the presidential system. This effect is particularly strong and significant when we
interact the type of polical system with competitivness in the election for the executive
office: the Gini coefficient is some 0.3 points less, controlling for the level of democracy.
We also interact each year during which country is in transition from Communism
(that is, all years after 1990 for all formerly Communist countries) with democracy in
order to sweep the already-noted paradoxical effect (see Gradstein and Milanovic, 2000)
of post-Communist transition during which increase in democracy was associated with
increase in inequality. The coefficient is always positive, and in 11 out of 12  cases
statistically significant with various (Polity- or DPI-measured) improvements in
democracy adding between 1 and 3 Gini points.
We conclude that the effect of democracy on inequality is negative but very weak.
It becomes statistically more significant when we assess country’s democracy by looking
at its level over a longer (three-year) time period. With one-year lag, the effect of
democracy almost vanishes. In addition, democracy reduces inequality more in
parliamentary and mixed systems than in presidential systems, while during the transition
from Communism, democratization is associated with increased inequality.24
Table 5. Inequality, ideology and democracy (lagged by a year)
Fixed effect regressions. Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Polity98D variables DPI variables
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Number of observations 815 816 608 607 603 602
Note: P-values between brackets (if P<0.05 shaded). The omitted ideology is Catholic (both as the dummy, and in the interaction between
democracy and religion); omitted system is presidential. The omitted country is Mexico which was Catholic and presidential throughout the entire
period. Coefficients for country dummies not shown.27
Table 6. Inequality, ideology and democracy (average level over the past three years)
Fixed effects regressions. Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Polity98D variables DPI variables
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Dummy gross (vs. net) 0.55 0.47 -0.05 0.02 0.22 0.1229




























Number of observations 795 796 560 559 556 555
Note: P-values between brackets (if P<0.05 shaded). The omitted ideology is Catholic (both as the dummy, and in the interaction between
democracy and religion); omitted system is presidential. The omitted country is Mexico which was Catholic and presidential throughout the entire
period. Coefficients for country dummies not shown.30
4.3. Effect of religion
Countries with Muslim, Confucian and Buddhist/Hindu ideology consistently show, both
in Tables 5 and 6, a statistically significant lower inequality that Catholic countries
(Catholicism, the most represented religion in terms of countries, is the omitted category).
Since we do not know what really explains lower inequality in these societies, we call
them “intrinsically more equal” (than Catholic), using “intrinsic” as a technical term, and
implying thereby that there are certain preferences for equality which may be due to the
differences in family formation (fewer nuclear households) or to greater informal
transfers—points raised in Section 1 above.
Looking at Table 5 and 6 results, the intercept (dummy variable) shows that the
inequality reducing effect of Islam—which is the most consistent and statistically
significant throughout—amounts to between 10 and 14 Gini points; the effect of
Confucianism which is also statistically significant in all but one case ranges between
 –14 and –25 Gini points, while the effect of Buddhism/Hinduism is between –11 and –14
Gini points. Communism too shows a statistically significant negative effect in four
regressions. At the other end of the spectrum, countries without a dominant religion
(Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago) consistently display greater intrinsic inequality (the
dummy variable is statistically significant in almost all formulations both in Tables 5 and
6). Protestant countries and the “new” Christian countries also show, in some instances, a
positive coefficient on the dummy variable. The intercept term for all other religions does
not differ from the one for the Catholic countries. The implication of our finding is that
Muslim and Confucian societies very strongly, and somewhat more tentatively31
Buddhist/Hindu, and Communist societies, exhibit certain features, independent of
whether they are democratic or not, which make then more equal than other societies.
This effect has been, in some previous empirical work on inequality, established for
Communist societies (Kaelble and Thomas, 1991; Ahluwalia, 1976; Milanovic 1996) but
not for the other three.
4.4. Interaction between democracy and religion
It is also possible that ideology exerts an impact on inequality indirectly, that is in
“determining” how a given level of democracy is “translated” (reflected) on inequality.
This effect comes in addition to the direct effect captured by the religion dummies. To
account for it, we interact religion dummy variables with democracy. We thus allow for
religion to affect both the intercept and the slope coefficients.
The results here somewhat vary between the two regressions. With a one-year
lagged DEMOCRACY, only Confucianism and Communism show a positive (inequality
increasing) effect of democracy (in at least two formulations out of six). The result for
Communism is not unexpected because greater political liberalization in Communist
countries in Eastern Europe (up to 1990), and in contemporary China and Vietnam, was
accompanied by economic liberalization and increased income differences. Thus a
combination of  intrinsic inequality-reducing effect of Communism (as reflected in the
intercept term), and increasing inequality with democratization makes intuitive sense. On
the other hand, the group of Christian mixed societies composed of Canada, Switzerland,
Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands shows a very strong inequality-reducing effect of
democracy present in all formulations (see Table 5). Nations with mixed religion too32
show that democracy reduces inequality: this effect is both strong and present in all the
formulations.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in Polity98D democracy
index (equivalent to an improvement from the level of Armenia to that of Australia, both
in 1998), reduces on average the Gini coefficient in mixed-religion societies by 5.6
points; similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the EIEC index (equivalent to an
improvement from Vietnam to Zimbabwe in 1997), reduces the Gini coefficient by 3.6
points. Other religions show no statistically significant effect in more than one case. 
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When we approximate DEMOCRACY using its three-year average value, the
number of religions with inequality-increasing effect of democracy goes up. In addition to
Confucian and Communist countries, there is now a strong evidence of a positive
relationship for Buddhist/Hindu societies, and somewhat weaker evidence for “New”
Christian and Orthodox countries. On the other side of the spectrum, the group of
Christian mixed/Judiasm and countries without a dominant religion is joined by countries
where  Protestantism is the dominant religion. They exhibit the same inequality reducing
effect, although it is not statistically significant in all the formulations.
Table 7 summarizes the effect of religion on inequality, by combining the
“intrinsic” effect of religion on inequality,  and the additional effect working through the
interaction term. For the effect to be deemed significant, we request that the sign of the
coefficient be the same (positive or negative) throughout all the formulations of the
regression, and that it be statistically significant at the 5 percent level in at least two cases
out of six.33
Table 7. Effect of different religions on inequality 1/
Additional effect of democracy on inequality 3/
(depending on the religious context)
Intrinsic effect of
religion 2/






















1/ Based on the results from Table 6.
2/ As reflected in the religion dummy variable.
3/ As reflected in interaction between democracy and religion.
Table 7 classifies all societies into six (out of possible nine) groups. Note first that
empty cells are the “extreme” societies. There are, according to our results, no religions
that are both intrinsically more egalitarian than Catholicism and where democracy has
more of a pro-equality effect (than under Catholicism); nor are there religions that are
intrinsically less equal than Catholic and where democracy increases inequality. Thus all
religions cluster in the  “middle” cells.
Second, we note that in all cases where societies are predominantly Judeo-Christian
greater democracy either reduces inequality—significantly as in the case of Protestant and
mixed Christian societies, or mildly so as in the case of Catholic, Orthodox, “new”
Christian, and African Christian/traditional societies. Unlike  the Judeo-Christian
societies, other cultures, notably Confucian and less so Buddhist/Hindu and Communist,34
show that while the effect of  increased democracy on inequality is positive,  they
apparently have other “intrinsic equalizers” independent of democracy which reduce
inequality. The same “intrinsic equalizers” are very strongly present in Muslim societies
too. Therefore, more equality seems, in the Judeo-Christian context,  and this particularly
in Protestant and mixed Christian societies, to be achieved through democracy, and
presumably, the ability which democracy gives to poorer segments of society to
redistribute some income (via government transfers and taxes) away from the rich.
23 In
the other societies (Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu, Confucian and Communist), the effect of
democratization on inequality is small or even positive, but inequality is  reduced, we
surmise, through other tools like religious alms, broadly provided state-sector
employment, private transfers between the generations, and generally stronger family, and
perhaps ethnic, ties. Whether such societies are democratic or not does not seem to
matter, as far as equality is concerned.
Third, an interesting case is offered by societies without a dominant religion. These
are in all but two cases (Fiji, and Trinidad and Tobago) African nations where traditional
African beliefs, Christianity and Islam each appeal to a broad segment of the population.
These religiously fragmented societies seem to possess certain features that make them
intrinsically more unequal than other societies.  However, on a positive note, democracy
there  is very strongly associated with reduced inequality, the way it is associated in
mixed Christian and Protestant nations. Thus, democracy, in addition to its positive
freedom-expanding effect, may also exert a desirable effect on inequality. To the  extent
that inequality stimulates inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict, one may speculate that35
democracy in such fractious settings may be a good tool for lessening inequalities and
thus the underlying tensions.
24
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that it is not democracy per se that matters for inequality—in fact,
its direct net effect appears quite weak. Our findings suggest rather that democratization
affects inequality indirectly.
First, through the social context and societal values within which it takes place. For
the Judeo-Christian societies, democratization is generally associated with reduction in
inequality. For Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu and Confucian societies, democracy has either
hardly discernible, or even a positive, effect on inequality. Yet these societies seem to
possess some features which make them intrinsically more equal than the Judeo-Christian
societies. It could be – although our empirical test does not account for that - that, the
same “desired” level of inequality which in the Judeo-Christian societies is achieved
through expanded franchise and government-sponsored redistribution, is implemented in
the Muslem, Buddhist/Hindu, and Confucian societies informally, through family and
ethnic ties.
Second, our empirical analysis indicates that democracy “works” through the type
of political system: controlling for the level of democracy, parliamentary systems are
more likely to generate lower inequality than presidential systems.  While this aspect was
not perceived by us as the main motivation for pursuing this work, the robustness of the
finding begs further empirical analysis and the development of theoretical foundations for
the study of the effect of political institutions on inequality.36
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APPENDIX: RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE COUNTRIES
Country Religious composition Assigned dominant
religion
Armenia Largest share Armenian Orthodox (94%), Russian Orthodox, Protestant, Islamic, Yazdi communities Communist; Orthodox
Australia 26% Roman Catholic, 50% various Protestant Protestant
Austria 77% Roman Catholic, 5% Protestants Catholic
Belgium Roman Catholic 75% Catholic
Burkina Faso Majority animist belief (65%), between 25% and 30% Muslims, some 10% Christian-mainly Roman
Catholic
African traditional
Bangladesh 85% Muslim, 16% Hindu, some Buddhist and Christian Muslim
Bulgaria Most are Bulgarian Orthodox Church (85%), and 13% Muslim. Communist; Orthodox
Bahamas Most inhabitants profess Christianity, largest are Anglican, Baptist, Roman Catholic & Methodist
Churches, overall various Protestants 52%, Catholics 19%.
Protestant
Belarus Major religion Eastern Orthodox (90%), and few Muslim and Jew Communist; Orthodox
Bolivia Almost all Christianity, majority are Roman Catholic (95%) Catholic
Brazil Almost all Christianity, 90% Roman Catholic Catholic
Barbados Almost all Christianity, largest is Angelican Church, small group of Hindus, Muslims & Jews; overall 67%
Protestant, 4% Catholic.
Protestant
Botswana 50% Christian; 50% traditional animist beliefs. African
Christian/traditional
Cent. Af. Rep. Christian between 33% and 50%, Muslims  between 5% and 15%, traditional beliefs about 25% African
Christian/traditional
Canada 45% Roman Catholic, 26% Protestants Churches, other numerous religions Christianity
mixed/Judeo
Switzerland 48% Protestants, 44% Catholic. Christianity
mixed/Judeo
Chile 89% Roman Catholic, 11% Protestant Catholic
China Confucianism, Buddhism, Daosim, also small Muslim and Christian minority (officially Communist) Communist
Cote d'Ivoire 63% traditional beliefs, 25% Muslims, 12% Roman Catholic African traditional
Cameroon 51% traditional beliefs, 33% Christian, 16% Muslims African
Christian/traditional
Colombia 95% Roman Catholic, also Protestant and Jewish. Catholic
Costa Rica 95% Roman Catholic, remaining are also Christian Catholic
Czechoslovakia Communist Communist
Czech Rep. 40% Roman Catholic, 5% Protestant Catholic40
FRG/Germany 45% Protestant, 39% Roman Catholic Christianity
mixed/Judeo
Djibouti More than 90% Muslims, 6% Christian Muslim
Denmark 87% Evangelical Lutheran Church, small percentage other Protestent, and Catholic Protestant
Dominican Republic More than 90% Roman Catholic, small communities of Protestants and Jews Catholic
Algeria Almost all Muslims (99%) Muslim
Ecuador More than 90% Roman Catholic Catholic
Egypt Between 80% and 90% Muslim, others Christians mainly Copts Muslim
Spain Almost all Roman Catholic (99%) Catholic
Estonia 62% Evangelical Lutheran Church, 30% Orthodox Communist; Protestant
Ethiopia Nearly half of the population are members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (North and Southern
plateau), the rest: Christian, Muslim and Animist
Orthodox
Finland 85.7% Evangelical Lutheran Church, almost all Christian Protestant
Fiji 53% Christians(mainly Methodists), 38% Hindus, 8% Muslims Mixed
France 81% Roman Catholic, other Christians, some Muslims and Jews Catholic
Gabon 60% Christians, mainly Roman Catholic “New” Christian
Gambia 85% Muslims, 10% Christians, small numbers of Animists Muslim
UK The Church of England dominant, some Roman Catholicism, Methodists and Baptists Protestant
Ghana 38% traditional beliefs, 30% Muslim, 24% Christians Mixed
Guinea Most inhabitants (85%) are Muslims, 8% Christian, some traditional animist beliefs Muslim
Guinea-Bissau Animism (65%) and Islam (30%) are principal religions, 5% Roman Catholics and other Christians African traditional
Greece 97% Greek Orthodox Orthodox
Guatemala About 80% Roman Catholic, about 20% Protestants Catholic
Guyana 57% Christianity, about 30% Hindu, Islam about 10% Mixed
Hongkong Confucian
Honduras 97% Roman Catholic Catholic
Hungary 65% Catholic church, 20% Calvinist, 5% Lutheran Church Communist; Catholic
Indonesia 87% Islam, about 10% Christians, remainders are Hindus and Buddhists Muslim
India 80% Hindu, 11% Muslim, others are Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and other minorities Hindu/Buddhist
Ireland About 95% Roman Catholics, 5% Protestants Catholic
Iran Great majority (95%) Muslims Muslim
Israel 81% Judaism, 14% Muslims Christianity
mixed/Judeo
Italy About 90% Roman Catholic Catholic
Jamaica Church of God' is the most numerous, majority population (56%) are various Protestant “New” Christian
Jordan More than  90% Muslims, 8% Christians Muslim
Japan Major religion: Shintoism and Buddhism; also Christian minority Confucian
Kazakhstan Predominant religion is Islam (47%), 15% Eastern Orthodox Communist; Muslim
Kenya 28% Catholic, 20% Protestants, about 20% African traditional beliefs, 8% Muslim African41
Christian/traditional
Kyrgyzstan The major religion is Islam (70%) Communist; Muslim
Korea, South Confucianism, Buddhism and Chundo Kyo are principal traditional religions; large percentage of
Christians (between 25% and 45%)
Confucian
Laos Communist Communist
Sri Lanka Nearly 70% Buddhists, 15% Hindus, 8% Muslim, 8% Christian Hindu/Buddhist
Lesotho 90% Christians, largest denominations are Catholic, Lesotho Evangelical and Anglican Churches “New” Christian
Lithuania Predominantly Roman Catholic (80%), 10% Orthodox, small minorities of Lutherans and Calvinists Communist; Catholic
Luxembourg 95% Roman Catholic, and small minority of Protestant Catholic
Latvia Most are Lutherans or Roman Catholics, 37% Russian Orthodox or Old Believers Communist; Protestant
Morocco Vast majority Muslim (99%) Muslim
Moldova Largest denomination is Eastern Orthodox Church Communist; Orthodox
Madagascar More than 50% Animist beliefs, 43% Christians, remainders are Muslims African
Christian/traditional
Mexico 90% Roman Catholic Catholic
Mali About 80% Muslims, 18% traditional Animist beliefs, 1.2% Christians Muslim
Mongolia No state religion but Buddhism is being encouraged Communist;
Hindu/Buddhist
Mauritania Almost all Muslims Muslim
Mauritius 50% Hindu, about 30% Christians, 17% Muslims Buddhist/Hindu
Malawi 75% Christianity, 10% traditional beliefs, 10% Muslims, Hindu minority “New” Christian
Malaysia Between 55% and 60% Muslims, 19% Buddhists, some Hindus, Christians and some traditional beliefs Muslim
Niger 95% Muslims, most remainders follow traditional beliefs Muslim
Nigeria 47% Muslims, 35% Christians, 18% Animist beliefs Mixed
Nicaragua Almost all are Roman Catholics (95%) Catholic
Netherlands 33% Roman Catholics, 25% Protestants Christianity
mixed/Judeo
Norway 86% Evangelical Church, almost all profess Christianity Protestant
Nepal 90% Hindu, 5% Buddhist, 3% Muslims Hindu/Buddhist
New Zealand 42% various Protestants (18% Angelican Churchs, 13% Presbytaerians), 13% Catholic Protestant
Pakistan Islam-State Religion, 97% Muslims Muslim
Panama 85%  Roman Catholics, 15% Protestants Catholic
Peru 90% Roman Catholic Catholic
Philippines 84% Roman Catholics, 4% Protestants, 6%Philippine Independent Church, 5% Muslims Catholic
Papua New Gui 90% profess Christianity (most Protestant) “New” Christian
Poland More than  90% Roman Catholic Church Communist; Catholic
Puerto Rico Most Roman Catholic Catholic
Portugal Almost all are Roman Catholic (97%) Catholic
Paraguay Almost 90% Roman Catholic, small Protestants minority Catholic42
Romania 83% Romanian Orthodox Churches, 6% Catholic Communist; Orthodox
Russia Largest religion Russian Orthodox (85%), some Muslims, and Buddhists Communist; Orthodox
Rwanda Most Christians (74%), 25% traditional Animist beliefs “New” Christian
Sudan About 70% Muslims, 25% Animists, 5% Christians Muslim
Senegal 94% Muslims, 4% Christians, mostly Roman Catholic, and a small number of Animists Muslim
Singapore Principal religions are Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and Hinduism Confucian
Sierra Leone About 30% each of Muslim and traditional beliefs, 10% Christians Mixed
El Salvador 88% Roman Catholic Catholic
Soviet Union Communist Communist
Slovakia 60% Roman Catholic Church,  8% Protestants (Evangelical Church) Catholic
Slovenia Largest religion Roman Catholic Communist; Catholic
Sweden Almost 90% Evangelical Lutheran Church Protestant
Seychelles Almost all are Christians (90% Roman Catholics) Catholic
Thailand Predominantly Buddhism (95%), 4% Muslims, and small Christian minority Hindu/Buddhist
Turkmenistan Most population (87%) profess Islam Communist; Muslim
Trinidad and Tobago 30% Roman Catholics, almost 30% various Protestant, 24% Hindus, 6% Muslims Mixed
Tunisia State religion-Islam; almost all inhabitants (98%) are Muslims, Muslim
Turkey 99% Muslims Muslim
Taiwan Predominantly Buddhism, some Muslims, Daoists, Christians (both Catholic and Protestant). Confucian
Tanzania 40% Christians, 33% Muslim, 25% African traditional beliefs, some Hindus Mixed
Uganda More than 60% Christians, 16% Muslims “New” Christian
Ukraine Ukranian Orthodox Church (75%), 14% Catholics, some Muslims Communist; Orthodox
USA Christianity is predominant religion (various Protestants a plurality) Protestant
Uzbekistan Islam-predominant religion; some Orthodox Christian Communist; Muslim
Venezuela 92% Roman Catholics Catholic
Vietnam Communist Communist
Yemen Almost all Muslims Muslim
Yugoslavia Serbian Orthodox Church (80%), Muslims Communist; Orthodox
South Africa Most inhabitants profess Christianity, some traditional African religions, small minority of Hindus and
some Muslims
“New” Christian
Zambia More than 60% Christians, others profess traditional beliefs, some Muslims and Hindus “New” Christian
Zimbabwe 55% Christians, a large numbers are in traditional beliefs, minority of  Muslims and Hindus Aftrican
Christian/traditional
Sources: Most of the data come from the Europa Yearbook (BM: what edition), complemented wth the Almanach and a number of Internet sources for
more “difficult” countries (e.g. for Ethiopia, http://www.africanconnection.org/docs/factsheets/ethiopia.html, for Sudan,
http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/reli003.htm, for South Korea and Ivory Coast, http://atheism.about.com/religion/atheism/library/world/KZ/bl_SKoreaReligion.htm,
for Fiji, From http://www.fiji.gov.fj/about/hist.html ).4344
                                                
1 See Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990, for a survey of earlier literature There also exists a related literature, which examines
the reverse causal link, from inequality to democracy, see Boix, 2000, and references therein.  While this paper
generally abstracts from this direction, the empirical analysis below takes the possibility of such reverse link into
account.
2 See also Jackman and Miller, 1996, for a dissenting view.
3 The dominant religion or ideology usually provides core values for a culture, although other social factors can
obviously also shape peoples’ values.
4 A central result in Arrow’s paper is that, for a large enough economy, all efficient allocations of income are
egalitarian in the sense that the difference between the minimal income level and the average one becomes
negligible.
5 More precisely, this is so unless there is a single individual whose final income is above the minimal income of the
receivers; a formal proof is available from the authors.
6 Specifically, suppose that I is one of these inequality measures and let I0 refer to its pre-tax value and I1(t) refer to
its post-tax value.  Straightforward calculations reveal then that I1(t) = (1-t) I0 /(1-B(t)), so that  dI1(t) /dt = [-(1-B)
+B’(1-t)]I0 /(1-B(t))
2  < 0, and d
2I1(t) /dt
2 > 0.  Thus, in both these cases inequality decreases as a result of increased
redistribution, albeit at a diminishing pace.
7 One long run implication of the above proposition, which we, however, do not test directly here, is that
democratization should result in a convergence in inequality levels across countries.
8 The terms “ideology” and “religion” will be used interchangeably.
9 The Polity98D database (produced in June 2000)  can be downloaded from the Internet at http://k-
gleditsch.socsci.gla.ac.uk/Polity.html.
10 Available on the Internet at ftp://isere.colorado.edu/pub/datasets/polity3/polity3.codebook.
11 For example, in explaining  how the variable “Democracy” is constructed,  Gurr (1997) writes that the variable is a
sum of three elements: competitivness of political participation (coded 1 to 3), competitivness of executive
recruitment (coded 1 to 2), and constraints on chief executive (coded 1 to 4). Political participation can be
competitive (3  “democracy points”), transitional (2) or factional (1). However, it is left unclear what exact
requirements need to be fulfilled in order for  political  participation to be deemed “competitive”;  apparently this is
left to the judgment of the authors.
12 The data come from the 1997 World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
13 The calculation is performed as follows. For most  countries, we have (from the World Bank sources) GDP per
capita in the 1995 US$ for all the years going back to 1960. We also have the benchmark 1995 GDP per capita in














                                                                                                                                                            
where  GDP$t,95 = dollar per capita GDP for year t expressed in dollars of 1995, and GDPPPP,t,95= PPP per
capita GDP for year t expressed in international prices (PPP) of 1995, to derive the GDPPPP for the years before
1995.
14 Kindly provided to the authors by Sampsa Kiiski. The data are also available at
<http://www.undp.org/poverty/initiatives/wider/wiid.htm.>
15 Household dummy is derived from the Reference unit variable in WIDER ; welfare indicator dummy is derived
from Income definution variable in WIDER. We also distinguish between gross and  net income or expenditures.
16 Note that this number is larger than the number of countries with Gini or GDP data alone, because of the countries
that may have one or another variable, but not all.
17 Between 1960 and 1964, the number of countries with GDPPPP per capita data varies between 84 and  90. After
1984, it is never less than 120 countries in each year.
18 For 19 countries, there is only one observation per country.
19 There are some exceptions. Ethiopia includes Eritrea until the separation of the two; Pakistan includes both West
Pakistan and Bangladesh until 1971. Also, former East Germany (German Democratic Republic) is ignored, and is
included only after the Unification in 1991.
20 Even dramatic regime changes like the Cuban revolution, or democratic changes in Eastern Europe took several
years to “percolate” to the level of income distribution. Less radical political changes (partial democratization,
strengthening of the opposition parties, greater openness of the media etc.) need even more time to affect inequality.
21 The country dummies are not shown since we are not per se interested in them.
22 Protestant countries show a statistically significant negative effect in two cases, and positive effect in one.
23 See the relationship between level of factor-income inequality and redistribution in Milanovic, 2000. The only
non-Judeo-Christian society in that sample is Taiwan (Province of China), and it exhibits features that are markedly
different from the rest: there is almost no redistribution and no reduction in inequality through the action of the
government tax-and-transfer system. And Taiwan has the most equal factor-income level distribution of all the
countries in the sample.
24 A similar point with respect to the role of democracy in prevention of violent conflict in fractionalized societies is
made in Collier, 1999, and Easterly, 2000.